OBSERVATIONS 


O   N 


MR.     S  T  E  D  M  A  N  '  s 


HISTORY 


OF       THE 


AMERICAN     W  A  R  . 


BY  LIRUTRNANT-GRNERAL  SIR  HENRY   CLINTON,  K.  B. 


LONDON: 


PRINTED    FOR   J.    DEBRETT,    OPPOSITE    BURLINGTON-HOUSE,    PICCADILLY. 


1794. 


OBSERVATIONS 


O   N 


MR.     S  T  E  D  M  A  N'  s 


HIST    OR    Y 


OF       THE 


AMERICAN     WAR 


BY  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  SIR   HENRY   CLINTON,  K.  B. 


LONDON: 


PRINTED   FOR  J.    DEBRETT,   OPPOSITE   BURLINGTON-HOUSE,    PICCADILLY. 


1794. 


: 


•  Jfcf 


FIFTY      COPIES, 

PRIVATELY    REPRINTED. 

NEW     YORK: 
1864. 


J.  M.   BRABSTREF.T  &  Sox,   PRINTERS 


iT  has  been  a  fashion  with  many  (owing  to  what  cause  I  will  not 
pretend  to  say)  to  declare,  that  in  losing  America,  we  have  neither  lost 
commerce,  military  character,  or  consequence.  Tho'  I  had  differed  'in 
opinion  respecting  all  these,  I  know  full  well  that  until  this  country  felt 
some  dire  misfortune,  in  consequence  of  the  lofs  of  that,  I  should  meet 
with  few  advocates  for  my  opinion.  Alas  !  has  not  that  dire  misfortune 
now  befallen  us  ?  Notwithstanding  the  zealous^  officer-like,  and  succefsful 
exertions  of  our  land  and  sea  chiefs,  and  their  gallant  navies  and  armies, 
these  last  are^  reduced  by  sicknefs  to  a  debility  the  more  alarming,  as  it 
carmot,  I  fear,  diminish,  but  must  increase.  Had  we  pofsefsed  the  continent 
of  America,  our  fleets  and  armies  might  have  retired  to  its  ports  during 
the  hurricanes  and  sickly  season,  attended  to  their  sick,  recovered  and 
recruited  both  navy  and  army,  and  returned  to  the  West  Indies  with  the 
means  of  further  exertion.  Where  have  we  now  a  healthy  safe  port  ? 
Halifax  is  almost  as  far. as  Europe;  while  in  the  American  ports  the  tri- 
colored  flag  flies  triumphant,  and  scarcely  a  Britifli  fhip  is  to  be  seen 
except  as  capture.  If  appearances  are  so  unpromising  now  we  are  said 
to  be  in  alliance  with  America,  how  it  will  happen,  fhould  we  unfor- 
tunately add  them  to  the  number  of  our  enemies,  I  need  not  predict. 
Altho'  I  had  received  my  Sovereign's  fullest  approbation  of  my  con- 
duct during  that  American  war,  as  will  appear  by  my  correspondence  with 
His  ministers,  contained  in  my  narrative,  &c.  publifhed  in  1783,  and  in 
the  following  pamphlet,  yet,  considering  every  person  employed  in  so 

important 


important  a  command  as  accountable  at  all  times  for  their  conduct,  I  con- 
ceive myself  called  upon  by  a  recent  publication,  which  has  miftated 
material  facts,  whether  from  error,  or  a  desire  of  courting  a  late  Governor 
General  of  India,  I  will  not  pretend  to  determine;  but  at  a  time  when  my 
services  were  actually  called  for,  and  these  more  than  insinuations  may 
make  an  imprefsion  on  the  public,  it  is  my  duty  to  refute  them ;  I  there- 
fore submit  the  following  observations  on  Mr.  Stedman's  History  of  the 
American  War,  to  the  candid  and  impartial  public,  who  will,  no  doubt, 
give  me  credit  for  my  forbearance  in  not  troubling  them  on  such  a  subject 
until  forced  into  it  by  an  unprovoked  attack. 


H.  C. 


OBSERVATIONS,  &c. 


kOIR  Henry  Clinton  finds  himself  obliged  to  notice  some  insinuations,  and 
contradict  some  afsertions  in  Mr.  Stedman's  History  of  the  American  War, 
lately  publifhed.  The  affair  of  Bunker's  Hill  has  been  stated  to  the  public 
by  the  general  officer  who  commanded  there :  the  volunteer  services  of  Sir 
II.  Clinton  in  that  action  were  amply  rewarded  by  the  manner  in  which  Sir 
W.  Howe  accepted  them. 

But  there  are  other  parts  of  the  History  which  prove,  that  Mr.  Stedman 
wanted  either  attention  or  candour.  He  afserts,  that  the  army,  during  the 
cannonade  of  the  fleet  on  the  28th  of  June,  1776,  had  embarked  two  or  three 
times  in  boats,  but  did  not  proceed  or  co-operate  with  the  attack  of  the 
navy.  Vol.  I.  page  186,  Mr.  Stedman  says  as  follows;  "at  twelve  o'clock 
"  the  light  infantry,  grenadiers,  and  the  fifteenth  regiment  embarked  in  boats, 
"  the  floating  batteries  and  armed  craft  getting  under  weigh  at  the  same  time, 
"to  cover  the  landing  on  Sulivan's  Island;  scarcely,  however,  had  the 
"  detachments  proceeded  from  Long  Island  before  they  were  ordered  to  dis- 
"  embark,  and  return  to  their  encampment.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the 
"  29th  they  were  again  embarked,  and  almost  immediately  afterwards  ordered 

B  "to 


"to  disembark."  The  fhortfaS  is  as  follows:  It  had  beenjftna/Iy  settled  by 
Commodore  Sir  P.  Parker  and  General  Clinton,  that  part  of  the  troops 
(there  were  boats  for)  were  to  have  landed  not  on  Sulivan's  Island,  as  Mr. 
Stedman  says,  but  on  the  main  land,  proceeding  to  it  by  creeks  communi- 
cating with  it ;  three  of  the  frigates  were  to  have  co-operated  with  the  troops 
in  an  intended  attack  upon  Hedrall's  Point,  where  the  enemy  had  a  work 
covering  their  bridge  of  communication  with  Sulivan's  Island :  the  three 
frigates  intended  for  co-operation  with  the  troops,  almost  immediately  run 
aground ;  in  the  hope  they  would  soon  float  and  proceed,  the  troops  em- 
barked on  the  28th,  and  finding  the  frigates  did  not  proceed,  the  troops  of 
course  disembarked,  the  same  on  the  ipth,  and  as  the  frigates  did  not  pro- 
ceed, the  troops  could  not.  General  Clinton  did  not  see  Sir  P.  Parker's 
public  letter,  or  know  that  his  own  had  not  been  publijhed,  till  the  November 
following,  when  he  received  a  letter  from  Lord  G.  Germaine  with  his 
Majesty's  approbation  of  his  conduct  at  Sulivan's  Island;  but  as  there  were 
certain  parts  of  the  Commodore's  letter  by  which  it  appeared  he  had  not 
been  sufficiently  explicit  with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  the  General  and  the 
army,  and  as  the  Minister  had  not  judged  proper  to  publifh  General  Clinton's 
letter,  General  Clinton  shall  first  give  an  extract  of  Sir  P.  Parker's  letter, 
and  then  an  extract  of  his  own  letter,  certain  queries  he  made  to  Sir  P. 
Parker,  and  that  Gentleman's  answers. 

Extract  of  Sir  P.  PARKER'^  Letter  tj  P.  STEPHENS,  Esq. 
July  9,   1776. 

"THE  fort  was  silenced  and  evacuated  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  but  the 
"  rebels  finding  the  army  could  not  take  pofsefsion,  re-entered  the  fort. 
"  Their  Lordfhips  will  see  plainly  by  this  account,  that  if  the  troops  could 
"have  operated  in  the  attack,  his  Majesty  would  have  been  in  pofsefsion  of 
"  Sulivan's  Island." 

ExtraEi 


(     3     ) 

Extraff  of  General  CLINTON'J  Letter  to  Lord  G.  GERMAINE, 
Long  Island,  July  2,  1776. 

"  IT  was  about  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  June,  when 
"  we  discovered  the  fleet  going  to  the  attack  of  Sulivan's  Island;  but  as 
"  they  did  not  appear,  when  they  brought  up,  to  be  within  such  a  distance 
"  as  to  avail  themselves  of  the  fire  from  their  tops,  grape-mot,  or  musquetry, 
"  I  was  apprehensive  no  imprefsion  would  be  made  on  the  fort;  I  likewise 
"  saw  that  the  three  frigates  which  the  Commodore  had  destined  to  cut  off 
"  the  rebel  communication  with  Hedrall's  Point,  and  to  favour  the  attack 
"  of  the  troops  on  that  battery,  were  aground  soon  after  the  leading  mips 
"  had  taken  their  station." 

General  Clinton  thought  it  necefsary  to  put  the  rollowing  queries  to  the 
Commodore,  after  that  gentleman  had  acknowledged  "  he  had  been  guilty 
"  of  some  omifsion,  and  had  not  been  sufficiently  explicit  in  bis  public  letter 
"  with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  the  army." 

§)uere  ift  from  Gen.  CLINTON  to  Sir  P.  PARKER. 

"  DID  I  not,  very  early  after  I  had  landed  on  Long  Island,  inform  you, 
"  it  was  discovered  that  there  was  no  ford  at  low  water  between  Long  Island 
"  and  Sulivan's  Island ;  and  that  I  feared  the  troops  could  not  co-operate  in 
"  the  manner  we  at  first  intended  they  mould  ?" 

Sir  P.  PARKER'.?  Answer  to  Sir  H.  CLINTON. 

"  YOU  certainly  made  known  your  difficulties,  and  in  your  letter  of  the 
"  1 8th  June  you  say,  'there  is  no  ford,  and  that  the  Generals  concurred  with 

"  you 


(      4      ) 

"  you  in  opinion,  that  the  troops   could   not   take  the   mare  in  the  intended 
"  attack  they  at  first  expected  to  do.'  ' 

<$uere  2d  from  General  CLINTON  to  Sir  P.  PARKER. 

"DID  I  not  offer  two  battalions  to  embark  on  board  the  fleet,  and  General 
"  Vaughan  to  command  them,  mould  you  see  any  service  in  which  they 
"  might  be  useful  on  your  side  ?" 

Answer. 

"  SOME  conversation  passed  between  General  Vaughan  and  myself  about 
"  troops,  but  I  did  not  think  it  material ;  and  I  was  so  extremely  ill  on  my 
"  bed  during  the  time,  that  I  could  not  attend  to  it,  and  am,  therefore, 
"  obliged  to  refer  you  to  General  Vaughan  for  the  particulars." 

Shtere  jd  from  General  CLINTON  to  Sir  P.  PARKER. 

"DID  I  not  request,  that  the  three  frigates  might  co-operate  with  the 
"  troops  on  their  intended  attack  on  the  post  of  Hedrall's  Point?" 

Answer. 

"THE  three  frigates,  besides  performing  the  services  mentioned  in  my 
"  public  letter,  were  intended  to  co-operate  with  you." 

Quere  ^.thfrom  General  CLINTON  to  Sir  P.  PARKER. 

"  IF  the  forts  were  silenced  and  evacuated  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  was  it 
"  the  troops  that  were  first  to  take  pofsefsion  (as  Sir  P.  Parker's  letter  may 
"  seem  to  imply)  or  the  sailors  and  marines,  which  Sir  P.  Parker  informed 
"  Sir  H.  Clinton  in  his  letter  of  the  25th  June,  he  had  practised  for  that 
"  purpose,  that  were  first  to  land  and  take  pofsefsion  ?" 

3  Answer. 


(     5     ) 

Answer. 

"  I  certainly  did  intend,  as  appears  by  my  letter  of  25th  June,  to  have 
"  attempted  taking  pofsefsion  of  the  fort  with  the  sailors  and  marines  first, 
"  but  I  could  not  have  planned  the  doing  of  it  with  about  300  men,  without 
"  the  prospect  of  speedy  support  from  you  ;  and  I  saw,  soon  after  the  attack 
"  begun,  from  a  variety  of  circumstances,  you  could  take  no  effectual  steps 
"  for  that  purpose." 

Sir  H.  Clinton  is  persuaded  there  needs  no  comment  on  the  above:  if  he 
mould  make  any,  it  would  be  the  two  following  fhort  ones  : 

First,  Had  the  frigates  been  able  to  proceed  to  their  stations,  an  attempt 
(pofsibly  a  succefsful  one)  might  have  been  made  on  the  port  of  Hedrall's 
Point. 

Secondly,  If  Commodore  Sir  P.  Parker  had  accepted  the  General's  offer 
of  two  battalions  to  embark  on  board  the  fleet,  he  would  have  had  a  suffi- 
cient force  to  take  and  keep  pofsefsion  of  the  fort  on  Sulivan's  Island,  bad 
that  fort  ever  been  silenced  or  evacuated. 

Page  2'2.  Vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  implies,  that  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  been 
censured  for  encumbering  himself  with  such  an  enormous  train  of  baggage, 
Sec.  in  his  march  through  Jersey  in  June,  1778.  Had  Mr.  Stedman  attended 
to  Sir  H.  Clinton's  letter  to  Lord  G.  Germaine,  he  would  have  seen  the 
cause  of  his  being  so  encumbered ;  and  also  "  of  that  enormous  train  not  a 
"  waggon  or  cart  was  captured  by  the  enemy." 

Respecting  all  that  gentleman's  remarks  on  the  aclion  of  Monmouth  Court 
House,  Sir  H.  Clinton  shall  only  observe,  that  had  Mr.  Stedman  attended  to 
Sir  H.  Clinton's  letter  to  Lord  G.  Germaine,  and  General  Lee's  trial,  which 
last  he  seems  to  have  read,  he  would  have  observed  that  the  two  Generals 

C  opposed 


opposed  to  each  other  on  that  day,  had  described  the  ground  and  detailed 
the  events  of  the  action  the  same.  The  comment  which  it  is  said  the  late 
King  of  Prussia  made  on  this  was,  "  that  there  needed  no  other  proof  of 
"  their  being  both  correct." 

The  fact  is,  that  it  would  have  been  scarcely  pofsible  for  General  Wash- 
ington to  have  gained  any  advantage  that  day  (as  he  had  put  three  defiles 
between  his  main  army  and  General  Lee's  corps)  unless,  as  General  Lee  says, 
"  depending  on  the  ungovernable  impetuosity  of  the  British ;  their  rear 
"  guard,  which  was  all  that  had  been  engaged,  had  passed  the  third  defile 
"  and  attacked  General  Wafhington's  whole  army,  which  I  find,  however, 
"  by  General  Clinton's  letter  to  Lord  G.  Germaine,  he  saw  the  impropriety 
"  and  danger  of,  and  had  no  idea  of  doing."  'Tis  true,  however,  that,  from 
Sir  H.  Clinton's  having  been  obliged  to  maintain  the  ground  on  his  side  the 
third  defile  till  certain  of  the  light  troops  (whose  zeal  and  ardour  had  carried 
them  much  farther  than  was  intended)  had  returned,  the  enemy  might 
have  hoped  that  Sir  H.  Clinton  intended  to  attempt  the  pafsage  of  the  third 
defile. 

Mr.  Stedman,  after  giving  every  merited  credit  to  operations  under  those 
respectable  officers,  General  Prevost  and  Sir  A.  Campbell  in  the  Floridas 
and  Carolina,  and  General  Matthews  and  Sir  G.  Collier  in  the  Chesapeak, 
in  a  note,  page  134,  vol.  ii.  says,  "  The  campaign  in  the  northern  parts  of 
"  America  was  spent  in  desultory  operations."  Surely  that  Gentleman  might 
have  known,  that  all  those  desultory  movements  were  necefsary  preludes  to 
others  more  solid,  which  could  not  be  carried  into  execution  for  want  of 
promised  and  adequate  reinforcement ;  nor  did  he  know,  perhaps,  that 
Admiral  Arbuthnot,  whom  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  been  afsured  would  sail  in 
March  with  the  reinforcement,  did  not  sail  till  July,  or  arrive  in  America 
till  the  end  of  August ;  or  that  the  Admira-l  brought  in  his  fleet  a  jail  fever, 
3  which 


(     7     ) 

which  fent  6000  men  to  the  hospital  immediately  ;   or  that  a  fuperior  French 
fleet,  with  troops  on  board,  was  on  the  coast. 

Page  i  80,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  "  that  General  Lincoln  had  reflected 
"  on  the  British  Commanders  for  their  tardinefs  in  making  their  approaches 
"  to  the  fiege  of  Charles  Town."  Surely,  it  might  naturally  occur  to  Mr. 
Stedman  (as  it  has  done  to  others)  that  every  delay  (mortifying  and  unavoid- 
able as  they  were)  tempted  General  Lincoln  to  fortify  Charles  Town  Peninsula, 
and  put  the  fate  of  both  Carolinas  on  that  of  Charles  Town. 

Mr.  Stedman  imputes  to  Sir  H.  Clinton's  proclamation  of  the  jd  June, 
1780,  (calling  upon  all  perfons  in  the  then  ftate  of  the  province  to  declare 
themfelves)  what  furely  cannot  be  attributed  to  it. 

He  fays,  page  200,  vol.  ii.  "One  Lifle,  who  had  belonged  to  a  rebel 
"  corps  while  it  was  under  the  command  of  Neale,  and  who  had  been 
"  banifhed  to  the  iflands  upon  the  fea  coafts  as  a  prifoner  upon  parole,  avail- 
"  inghimfelf  of  the  Commander  in  Chief's  proclamation  of  the  jd  of  June,  took 
"  the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  exchanging  his  parole  for  a  certificate  of  his  being 
"  a  good  fubject;  returning  to  his  former  abode  he  obtained  a  command 
"  under  Colonel  Floyd,  and  as  foon  as  the  battalion  of  militia  was  fupplied 
"  with  arms  and  ammunition,  had  the  treacherous  addrefs  to  carry  it  off  to 
"  Colonel  Neale."  Is  it  quite  so  certain  that  fuch  mifchievous  confequences 
can  be  imputed  to  Sir  H.  Clinton's  proclamation  of  the  jd  of  June,  1780? 
Paroles  had  been  given  before  the  province  of  South  Carolina  had  been  fub- 
dued ;  but  when  General  Williamfon's  furrender  had  put  an  end  to  all 
oppofition  in  that  province,  Sir  H.  Clinton,  not  as  a  Commander  in  Chief, 
but  as  his  Majefty's  sole  Commiffioner  to  his  provinces  in  America,  did  ifTue 
the  above  proclamation  ;  and,  perhaps,  under  all  circumftances,  it  was  at  the 
time  it  was  ifTued  both  politic  and  proper.  And  if  one  Lifle  did  exchange 
his  parole  for  a  certificate  of  his  being  a  good  fubject,  &c.  &c.  this  furely 
cannot  be  imputed  to  Sir  H.  Clinton's  proclamation  of  the  jd  June,  1780, 

for 


(      8      ) 

for  thofe  who  read  it  will  find,  that  very  proclamation  forbids  and  excludes, 
by  defcription,  almoft  by  name,  Mr.  Lifle  from  holding  any  commiffion 
in  his  Majefty's  fervice,  and  that  perfons  having  been  banifhed  to  the 
iflands  marked  him  fufficiently  for  fufpicion  at  leaft ;  and  furely  if  all  this 
had  been  attended  to,  this  fame  Lifle  would  not  have  obtained  a  certificate  of 
his  being  a  good  fubjecl,  or  have  been  appointed  to  any  command,  and  confe- 
quently  he  would  not  have  had  it  in  his  power  to  have  committed  the  above 
traitorous  act.  Mr.  Stedman  may  furely  find  other  caufes  for  the  revolution 
in  the  minds  of  certain  people  in  South  Carolina  at  the  time  he  mentions, 
even  though  he  mould  have  been  convinced,  the  civil  adminiftration  under 
which  the  province  then  was  had  not  contributed.  The  approach  of  General 
Gates  with  an  army;  the  French  already  arrived,  and  reinforcements  expected; 
the  Spanish  interference ;  the  Dutch  added  to  Great  Britain's  enemies  ;  and 
the  armed  neutrality  ;  all  these  probably  had  their  efFecl. 

Page  319,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman,  in  a  note,  fays,  "Dr.  Ramfey,  in  his 
"  History  of  the  Revolution  in  South  Carolina,  charges  the  British  with 
"  seizing  the  property  of  the  Americans,  and  their  Commiffaries  and  Quarter- 
"  mafters  with  taking  provifions  and  all  other  things  they  wanted  for  the 
"  army,  wherever  they  could  find  them,  and  charging  them  to  the  Britifh 
"  government."  What  Mr.  Stedman  obferves  is  as  follows  :  "  That  pecula- 
"  tion  was  carried  on  in  fome  of  the  departments  of  the  army,  and  that  many 
"  individuals  made  large  fortunes,  cannot  be  denied  ;  but  this  never  took  place 
"  to  any  extent  in  the  fouthern  army,  and  the  writer  of  this  (who  was  Com- 
"  miflary  of  the  army  under  Lord  Cornwallis)  takes  the  prefent  occafion  of 
"  repelling  the  calumnies  of  Dr.  Ramfey,  as  far  as  they  may  relate  to  himfelf." 

Mr.  Stedman  has  in  the  courfe  of  this  Hiftory  repeatedly  implied,  as  Lord 
Cornwallis  had  done  before  in  his  examination  at  the  Board  of  Public 
Accounts,  in  February,  1782,  that  this  abufe,  this  fcandalous  peculation  had 

exifted ; 


(     9     ) 

exifted ;  and  Mr.  Stedman  further  implies,  that  owing  to  his  carrying  into 
execution  the  orders  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  it  had  been  flopped.  Mr.  Stedman 
points  out  the  great  advantage  arifing  to  the  Army  and  the  Public  from  thefe 
orders  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  as  the  CommifTioners  of  Public  Accounts  had  done 
before,  in  their  Seventh  Report  on  Expenditures,  wherein  they  afcribe  to  the 
orders  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  of  the  2jd  December,  1780  the  merit  of  having 
flruck  at  abufes,  which,  fay  thofe  Gentlemen,  did  actually  exift  when  his 
Lordfhip  ifTued  thofe  orders.  Sir  H.  Clinton  has  already,  in  a  Letter  to  thofe 
Gentlemen,  written  and  publifhed  in  1784,  (a  copy  of  which  was  then  deli- 
vered to  Lord  Cornwallis)  explained  this  whole  bufinefs  fully,  and  proved, 
first,  that  thofe  Gentlemen  had  made  their  Seventh  Report  on  ex  parte  infor- 
mation, when  they  might  have  had  his,  and  thofe  of  certain  Officers  of  the 
different  departments,  who  had  actually  announced  themfelves  to  the  Board 
before  they  delivered  in  their  Seventh  Report ;  that  they  had  not  availed 
themfelves  of  authentic  information  and  Sir  H.  Clinton's  correfpondence  with 
the  Treafury,  both  of  which  had  been  recommended  to  them  by  Mr.  Robin- 
fon,  and  by  order  of  the  Lords  of  the  Treafury ;  that  they  had  pafsed  an 
implied  cenfure  on  Sir  H.  Clinton  of  negligence  in  the  expenditure,  and  had 
given  a  merit  to  Lord  Cornwallis  that  did  not  belong  to  his  Lordfhip,  but  to 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  :  and,  finally,  that  Letter  proves,  that  there  would  have 
been  no  neceflity  for  Lord  Cornwallis's  order  of  the  2jd  December,  1780,  if 
his  Lordfhip  had  paid  proper  attention  to  thofe  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  of  many 
months  prior  date,  and  of  which  his  Lordfhip  could  not  be  ignorant,  as  his 
Lordfhip  was,  at  the  time  Sir  H.  Clinton  ifsued  thefe  orders,  in  the  fame 
camp  with  him.  But  as  Mr.  Stedman  chufes  again  to  refume  this  fubject,  and 
to  afcribe  the  merit  of  the  oeconomical  fyflem  to  Lord  Cornwallis,  as  Sir  H. 
Clinton's  letter  to  the  Commimoners  of  Public  Accounts  did  not  (Sir  H.  Clin- 
ton apprehends)  circulate  fo  generally  as  Sir  H.  Clinton  hoped  and  intended 

D  it 


it  fhould,   he   thinks  it   neceflary   to   anfwer  all  the   above   infmuations  and 
aflertions,  from  whatever  quarter  they  may  come,  in  the  following  manner  : 

That  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  ifTued  orders  of  fimilar  effect  to  those  of  Lord  Corn- 
wallis,  of  Dec.  23,  1780,  as  far  as -respects  the  CommifTary  General's  depart- 
ment, and  the  delivering  captured  provifions  to  the  troops  gratis,  and  faving 
the  Crown  rations  to  the  Public  in  1776  and  1777,  even  before  he  com- 
manded the  army:  that  in  July  1779,  ne  appointed  Commiffioners  of 
Captures  (totally  diftinct  from  the  Commiffary  General's  department)  and  for 
the  above  purpofes  ;  that  it  had  been  reported  to  Sir  H.  Clinton,  by  the 
Deputy  Commiflary  General,  that  near  a  million  of  rations  had  been  faved  to 
the  Public  while  he  remained  in  South  Carolina,  and  his  orders  were  attended 
to ;  during  which  time  Lord  Cornwallis  was  under  his  immediate  orders,  and 
Mr.  Stedman  was  acting  as  Deputy  Commiflary  of  captured  forage,  by  Sir 
H.  Clinton's  orders  of  February  1780.  Sir  H.  Clinton  perfectly  agrees  with 
Lord  Cornwallis,  the  Commiffioners  of  Public  Accounts,  and  Meflrs.  Sted- 
man and  Ramfay,  that  infamous  abufe  and  peculation  might  have  exifted, 
but  takes  leave  again  to  aflert,  that  he  iflued  orders,  foon  after  he  came  to 
the  command,  moft  effectually  to  prevent  it ;  nor  could  it  well  have  exifted 
to  the  northward,  at  that  time,  for  to  enable  Lord  Cornwallis  to  act  offen- 
fively,  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  reduced  the  army  under  his  immediate  orders  to  a 
ftrict  defenfive.  There  needs  no  other  proof  when  and  where  this  peculation 
was  effectually  flopped,  than  the  following  letter  from  Mr.  Robinfon,  written 
by  order  of  the  Lords  of  the  Treafury,  approving  Sir  H.  Clinton's  having  efta- 
blifhed  Commiflaries  of  Captures  for  the  purpqfe  of  Juf -plying  the  army  gratis,  and 
faving  the  Crown  rations  to  the  Public. 


Copy 


Copy  of  a  letter  from  John  Robinfon,  Efq.  late  Secretary  to  the  Treasury,  to  Sir 
H.  Clinton,  late  Commander  in  Chief  of  His  Majefly  s  Army  in  North  America, 
dated  Treasury  Chambers,  igth  December,  1780. 

"  The  Lords  of  his  Majefty's  Treafury  having  received  information  of  the 
"  fteps  which  were  taken  by  your  Excellency  to  appoint  Commiffaries  of 
"  Captures,  upon  your  expedition  to  South  Carolina,  for  the  purpofe  of  pre- 
"ferving  the  property  of  his  Majefty's  loyal  fubjedts  in  that  country,  and 
"  making  them  fome  recompenfe  for  their  lofles  and  damages  fuftained  ;  and 
"  for  the  purpofe  of  converting  to  the  good  of  his  Majefty's  fervice,  and  to 
"  the  ufe,  convenience,  and  benefit  of  the  army,  all  the  cattle  and  moveable 
"  property  which  might  be  captured  from  his  Majefty's  enemies  ;  and  finding 
"that  Major  Hay,  one  of  the  gentlemen  appointed  by  your  Excellency  in 
"  February,  1780,  one  of  the  Commiffioners  was  in  England,  on  account  of 
"  his  health,  their  Lordfhips  defired  the  favour  of  his  attendance  on  their 
"  Board,  to  explain  to  them  all  the  circumftances  of  that  commiffion,  and 
"the  nature  of  the  proceedings  thereon:  and  Major  Hay  having  given  their 
"  Lordfhips  every  fatisfaftory  information  thereon,  it  appears  to  their  Lord- 
"  fhips,  that  this  meafure  has  been  not  only  of  great  utility  and  convenience 
"  to  the  army  and  navy,  and  his  Majefty's  loyal  fubjecls,  but  is  an  act  of 
"juftice  and  humanity,  and  may  be  hereafter  of  the  greateft  confequence  to 
"  prevent  many  abufes,  and  fave  considerable  expenfes  ;  I  am,  therefore, 
"commanded  by  their  Lordships  to  acquaint  your  Excellency  that  they 
"approve  entirely  not  only  of  your  continuing  fuch  Commiffioners  in  Caro- 
"  Una,  but  alfo  of  your  eftablifhing  others  of  the  like  nature  ;  and  their  Lord- 
"  ships  request  that  you  will  acquaint  me,  for  their  information,  whether  any 
"fuch  plan  was  adopted  in  the  expeditions  in  Jerfey,  and  from  head  of 
"  Elk  to  Philadelphia,  in  1776  and  1777,  or  in  any  other;  and  whether  the 
"cattle  and  moveables  taken  in  fuch  expeditions  were  brought  to  any  account 

"for 


"  for  the  benefit  of  the  army,  or  advantage  of  the  public,   by  fuch  Commif- 
"  faries,  or  any  other  perfons  whatever  ? 

Sir  H.  Clinton,  in  anfwer  to  this  letter,  could  only  inform  their  Lordfhips, 
he  was  not  in  the  chief  command  at  that  period,  and  refer  the  Lords  of  the 
Treafury  to  the  Commiflary  General,  Mr.  Weier,  afluring  them  at  the  fame 
time,  "  That  even  before  he  came  to  the  command,  whenever  he  had  been  de- 
"  tached,  he  had  always  appointed  Commiflaries  of  Captures,  that  the  army 
"  and  navy  might  receive  fuch  captured  provifions  gratis,  and  the  Crown 
"  provisions  faved  to  the  Public." 

Sir  H.  Clinton  now  leaves  fuch  of  the  Commiffioners  of  Public  Accounts 
as  neglected  to  avail  themfelves  of  the  information  offered  by  the  Treafury  to 
Lord  Cornwallis,  and  the  Commiflary  of  Captures,  Mr.  Stedman,  to  make 
their  comments  on  the  above;  it  will  be  obvious  to  the  candid  Public,  that  if 
the  above  ceconomical  fyftem,  fo  much  approved  by  the  Lords  of  His  Ma- 
jefty's  Treafury,  was  eftablifhed  by  Sir  H.  Clinton,  in  February  and  May, 
1780,  and  near  a  million  of  rations  were  faved  to  the  Public  during  that 
period,  if  there  were  no  favings  to  the  Public  made  between  June  and  De- 
cember, 1780,  and  that  scandalous  abuje  alluded  to  did  actually  exift  at  that  time,  as 
Lord  Cornwallis  implies,  and  the  Commiffioners  of  Public  Accounts  aflert  it 
did,  fo  far  from  commending  his  Lordship  for  having  ftopt  the  abufe  by  his 
order  of  the  2jd  December,  1780,  they  would  have  blamed  him  for  having, 
by  his  inattention  to  Sir  H.  Clinton's  orders,  fuffered  it  to  exift  fo  long. 

Dr.  Ramsay  has,  it  is  said  also,  infinuated,  that  the  plunder  taken  at  the 
fiege  of  Charlestown  was  fo  confiderable,  that  the  Brigadier-Generals,  ferving 
at  that  fiege,  fhared  upwards  of  5000!.  Sir  H.  Clinton  need  not  fay,  that  he 
did  not  think  it  became  him,  as  His  Majefty's  Commiffioner  to  the  Revolted 
Colonies,  to  take  any  fhare  of  plunder  mjuch  a  war.  That  there  was  money 
arifing  from  the  fale  of  public  (lores,  &c.  &c.  is  very  certain,  and  that  the 
navy,  ferving  on  that  expedition,  fhared  considerably  fourteen  years  fince  : 
that  a  fmall  fum,  not  exceeding  io,oool.  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  agents, 

appointed 


(      13     ) 

appointed  by  the  field  officers  of  the  army,  is  equally  certain ;  but  it  is  no 
lefs  certain,  that  thofe  agents,  though  they  have  repeatedly  received  the  Trea- 
fury  mandates  to  pay  that  money  into  the  Bank,  have  as  conftantly  evaded 
the  order  under  moft  frivolous  pretences ;  and  that  the  army  is  now  waiting 
to  receive  a  very  fmall  mare  of  plunder  taken  at  a  fiege,  and  of  which  the 
navy  divided  their  ample  mare  full  fourteen  years  fince  !  ! 

Page  244,  vol.  ii.  Speaking  of  the  attempt  in  Jerfey,  in  June,  1780,  Mr. 
Stedman  fays,  "  The  real  object  of  this  expedition  was  probably  againft  the 
"  American  magazines  at  Morris  Town  ;  but  the  oppofition  which  the  Com- 
"  wander  in  Chief  met  with  at  Springfield,  was  an  indication  that  every  mile 
"  of  his  future  march  through  a  country  naturally  difficult,  and  abounding 
"with  ftrong  pafles,  would  be  not  lefT  obftinately  difputed,  and  determined 
"  him  to  abandon  the  enterprize." 

Mr.  Stedman  feems,  in  this  account,  to  have  followed  American  writers; 
had  he  inquired,  he  would  have  found  Sir  H.  Clinton  did  not  arrive  at  New 
York  till  after  this  expedition  had  taken  place ;  that  Sir  H.  Clinton  knew  no- 
thing of  this  anticipated  movement  (which,  as  he  had  not  the  leaft  reafon  to 
expect  it,  he  had  not  forbid).  If  it  had  not  taken  place,  or  could  have  been 
ftopt  in  time  by  either  of  the  officers  he  had  fent  to  prepare  for  one,  in  which 
he  intended  to  have  taken  a  part  with  the  corps  he  had  purpofely  brought 
from  Charleftown,  fuccefs  of  fome  importance  might  have  been  the  confe- 
quence  :  as  it  was,  every  movement  that  did  take  place  after  Sir  H.  Clinton's 
return  to  New  York,  was  merely  to  retire  the  corps  (which  had  moved  into 
Jerfey)  without  affront. 

Page  245,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  "  When  the  French  armament  of 
"  eight  fail  of  the  line  and  6000  troops,  under  Rochambeau  and  De  la  Ternay, 
"  arrived  at  Rhode  Ifland,  the  Britifh  fleet  under  Admiral  Arbuthnot  was  infe- 
"  rior,  and  a  plan  was  laid  for  attacking  New  York  ;  but  the  arrival  of  fix  fail 
"  of  the  line  from  England,  which  followed  clofe  on  the  track  of  Chevalier  de 

E  "  Ternay, 


(      14      ) 

"  Ternay,  foon  gave  Admiral  Arbuthnot  the  fuperiority,  and  the  British  com- 
"  manders,  inftead  of  waiting  to  be  attacked,  made  preparations  in  their  turn 
"for  acting  offenfively  against  the  French  at  Rhode  Ifland.  Sir  H.  Clinton 
"  with  the  tranfports  and  troops  deftined  for  this  expedition  proceeded  to 
"  Huntingdon  Bay,  in  the  Sound,  whilft  Admiral  Arbuthnot  with  the  mips 
"  of  war  failed  round  Long  Ifland,  in  order  to  co-operate  by  fea.  But,  in  the 
"  mean  time,  General  Washington,  whofe  army  had  been  increafed  by  the 
"  arrival  of  feveral  reinforcements,  suddenly  parted  the  North  River  and  ap- 
"  proached  Kingfbridge  ;  fo  unexpected  a  movement  obliged  Sir  H.  Clinton 
"  to  abandon  the  expedition  to  Rhode  Ifland,  and  return  with  the  troops  for 
"  the  protection  of  New  York." 

Perhaps  Mr.  Stedman  affigns  here  the  beft  reafon  why  the  expedition  could 
not  take  place  ;  but  as  he  proceeds  and  fays,  "  the  object  of  this  expedition 
"  was  loft  from  a  circumftance  but  too  frequent  in  the  hiftory  of  this  country, 
"a  dif agreement  between  the  Commanders  In  Chief  of  the  land  and  naval  Jervice." 
As  this  is  the  fecond  insinuation  of  this  fort  Sir  H.  Clinton  finds  himfelf  called 
upon  to  fay  a  few  words. 

Sir  H.  Clinton,  on  receiving  private  information  of  the  expected  arrival  of  a 
French  armament  at  Rhode  Ifland,  propofed  to  Admiral  Arbuthnot  (when  he 
fhould  be  joined  by  Admiral  Greaves)  that  the  French  troops  fhould  be  met  at 
their  landing;  for  which  purpofe  Sir  H.  Clinton  was  to  have  entered  and 
landed  in  the  Seconet  Paflage  with  6000  men,  covered  by  fome  frigates  ;  and 
all  that  was  requefted  of  the  Admiral  was  to  block  with  his  large  fliips  the 
principal  harbour,  until  any  fuccefs  the  troops  might  meet  with  fhould  induce 
the  fleet  to  co-operate;  but  if  the  expedition  fliould  not  take  place  before  the 
French  troops  fhould  have  been  landed,  and  have  repaired  the  works  of  New- 
port, and  they  fhould  alfo  have  been  reinforced,  in  that  cafe  Sir  H.  Clinton  had 
given  it  as  his  humble  opinion,  that  the  troops  could  not  venture  to  act,  un- 
lefs  the  fleet  would  take  an  active  part  as  well  as  the  troops.  It  so  happened, 

4  that 


(     '5     ) 

that  the  French  armament  arrived  at  Rhode  Ifland  many  days  before  Admiral 
Greaves  had  joined  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  or  that  this  laft  had  been  informed  of 
their  arrival :  thus  circumftanced,  all  were  of  opinion  the  troops  could  not  act 
alone,  and  the  Admiral  did  not  judge  it  prudent  to  attempt  the  great  entrance 
with  his  fleet,  oppofed  by  that  of  the  enemy  covered  by  batteries,  and  thought 
that  of  the  Narraganfet  unfafe  for  mips  of  draft.  Could  this  attempt  have 
been  made  immediately  on  the  arrival  of  the  French  armament,  as  it  would  have 
been  unexpected,  it  might  have  fucceeded  ;  but  after  the  enemy  had  been  in 
pofsefsion  of  fuch  a  place  as  Newport,  and  the  Harbour  and  Iflands,  fixteen 
or  eighteen  days,  Sir  H.  Clinton  is  free  to  own,  he  could  have  had  little  hopes 
(even  if  the  fleet  could  have  co-operated),  which  Sir  Henry  is  far  from  faying 
he  thinks  they  could. 

Page  317,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  "in  the  fall  of  the  preceding  year,  the 
"lofTof  Major  Fergufon's  detachment  obliged  Lord  Cornwallis  to  return 
"  from  his  Northern  expedition,  and  fall  back  to  Wynnefborough  in  South 
"  Carolina.  Still,  however,  the  projected  movement  into  North  Carolina 
"  was  deemed  so  eflential,  that  he  only  waited  for  reinforcements  to  renew  it." 

In  the  firft  place,  Sir  H.  Clinton  cannot  help  being  of  opinion,  that  the  lofl"  ~j 
of  Colonel  Fergufon  was  owing,  in  a  great  meafure,  to  Lord  Cornwallis's 
having  detached  Colonel  Fergufon  with  a  body  of  Militia,  without  any  fupport 
of  regular  troops,  notwithftanding  his  Lordfliip  had  informed  Sir  H.  Clinton, 
although  that  brave  and  zealous  officer,  judging  of  himself,  had  hoped  he 
would  make  the  militia  fight  without  any  fupport  of  regular  troops. 

His  Lordfhip  obferved,  "  That  fuch  hopes  were  contrary  to  the  experience       / 
"  of  the  army,  as  well  as  of  Major  Fergufon  himfelf."      That  his  Lordfliip 
fhould,  after  this  opinion,   not  only  fuffer  Colonel  Fergufon   to   be  detached 
without  fupport,  but  put  fuch   a  river  as  the  Catawba  between  him  and  Fer- 
gufon, was  matter  of  wonder  to  Sir  H.  Clinton  and  all  who  knew  it. 

Mr. 


(      16     ) 

Mr.  Stedman  feems  to  imply,  "  that  the  fecond  movement  into  North 
"  Carolina  was  made  in  confequence  of  a  fettled  plan  approved  by  Sir 
"  H.  Clinton."  Sir  Henry,  when  he  left  Lord  Cornwallis  in  command  in 
South  Carolina  in  June,  1780,  left  his  Lordfhip  with  the  following  order: 
" 'Tis  not  my  intention  to  prevent  your  Lordfhip  acting  ofFenfively  in  cafe 
"  an  opportunity  offers  confiftent  with  the  Jecurity  of  Charles  'Town,  which  is 
"  always  to  be  confidered  as  a  primary  object."  Lord  Cornwallis  had 
therefore  Sir  H.  Clinton's  tacit  approbation  for  any  move  he  mould  judge 
proper  to  make  with  perfect  Jecurity  to  Charles  "Town  ;  and  Sir  H.  Clinton,  in- 
formed of  Lord  Cornwallis's  intentions  of  going  into  North  Carolina,  had 
certainly  approved.  In  his  letter,  however,  to  Lord  Cornwallis,  after  he 
heard  of  the  unfortunate  affair  of  Cowpens,  it  will  be  feen,  that  if  Sir  H. 
Clinton  had  hopes,  thofe  hopes  were  founded  in  the  opinion  Sir  Henry 
had  of  Lord  Cornwallis's  knowledge  and  abilities  ;  but  hearing  his  Lordfhip 
had  loft  all  his  light  troops  at  Cowpens,  convinced  what  little  hopes  he  could 
have  without  them,  though  Sir  H.  Clinton  certainly  did  not  difapprove 
for  the  above  reafons  then :  if  his  Lordfhip  had  informed  him  before  he 
made  the  movement  (as  Sir  Henry  is  perfuaded  his  Lordfhip  will  acknow- 
ledge it  would  have  been  more  regular  to  have  done*)  "  that  the  works  of 
"  Charles  Town  had  been  in  part  thrown  down,"  and  that  capital  (which  had  been 
Jo  flrongly  recommended  to  his  particular  care)  confequently  open  and  expojed,  Sir 
H.  Clinton  could  not  have  approved  of  an  operation  of  fo  much  danger  to 
South  Carolina  and  its  capital :  nor,  indeed,  is  it  quite  fo  certain  that  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  perfectly  confiftent  when  he  made  his  fecond  movement 
into  North  Carolina,  for  it  would  rather  feem  he  made  it  fomewhat  in  con- 
tradiction to  his  own  opinion,  given  not  many  weeks  before  through  Lord 
Rawdon,  after  his  Lordfhip  had  returned  from  an  unfuccefsful  attempt  to 
recover  North  Carolina,  in  October,  1780.  Lord  Rawdon  wrote  to  Sir  H. 
Clinton,  at  Lord  Cornwallis's  desire,  thus  :  "  The  people  of  North  Carolina 

"had 
*  Lord  Rawdon's  Letter  lo  Lord  Cornwallis. 


(  I?  ) 

"  had  not  given  evidence  enough  either  of  their  numbers  or  activity  to  jus- 
"  tify  the  ftake  of  South  Carolina  for  the  uncertain  advantages  which  might  •> 
"  attend  an  immediate  junction  with  them  :"  and  again,  "  Lord  Cornwallis 
"  forefees  all  the  difficulties  of  an  offensive  war  ;  but  his  Lordmip  thinks 
"  they  cannot  be  weighed  againft  the  dangers  which  muft  have  attended  an 
"  obftinate  adherence  to  his  former  plan  of  marching  into  North  Carolina." 
But  notwithftanding  the  above  opinions  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  and  after  he 
had  loft  his  light  troops,  that  he  had  opened  Charles  Town,  and  was  cer- 
tain he  mould  leave  it  in  an  expofed  ftate,  that  he  had  deftroyed  his  waggons, 
(except  a  few)  and  confequently  had  not  the  means  of  making  z.Jolid  move, 
or  of  giving  the  experiment  a  fair  trial,  he  proceeds  on  this  expedition  into 
North  Carolina. 

Page  348,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  "  three  days  after  the  action  of 
"  Guilford,  Lord  Cornwallis  began  to  retire,  by  eafy  days  marches,  towards 
"  Croffcreeks." 

Nobody  can  give  Lord  Cornwallis  more  credit  for  his  zealous  exertions  at 
the  battle  of  Guilford  Court  Houfe  than  Sir  H.  Clinton  ;  but,  alas  !  that 
victory  had  every  confequence  of  a  defeat. 

Page  352,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  "nothing  now  remained  to  be  done, 
"  but  to  proceed  with  the  army  to  Wilmington." 

Perhaps  Mr.  Stedman  does  not  know  that  Lord  Cornwallis  had  been 
ordered,  and  had  promifed,  in  cafe  of  failure  in  North  Carolina,  to  fall  back  on 
South  Carolina,  "and  fecure  it;"  that  when  at  Croflcreek  his  Lordmip 
was  nearer  to  Campden  (where  Lord  Rawdon  was,  and  where  he  could  be 
fupplied  with  every  thing) ;  or,  that  by  falling  back  from  thence  on  Campden, 
he  faved  South  Carolina,  Charles  Town,  and  Campden,  as  by  going  to  Wil- 
mington he  expofed  all  three. 

Page  353,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  affigns  reafons  for  Lord  Cornwallis's  not 
going  to  South  Carolina,  and  for  his  going  to  Virginia. 

That 


That  Gentleman  could  not  furely  be  ignorant  that  Lord  Cornwallis  could 
return  fafely  into  South  Carolina.  He  may  alfo  have  probably  heard,  that 
Colonel  Balfour,  Commandant  of  Charles  Town,  had  entreated  his  Lordfhip 
to  return  to  South  Carolina,  informed  him  that  nothing  elfe  could  fave  the 
province  or  its  capital,  that  he  might  return  by  the  Waggermaw  river,  and 
that  in  the  hope  he  would,  he  had  fent  gallies,  &c.  into  that  river,  and  had 
alfo  occupied  George  Town ;  nor  could  there  be  the  leaft  doubt,  but  that 
by  going  into  South  Carolina,  (even  though  his  Lordfhip  had  embarked  and 
proceeded  there)  he  faved  that  province  and  its  capital  ;  and  that,  on  the 
contrary,  by  going  into  Virginia,  he  not  only  difregarded  the  orders  of  the 
Commander  in  Chief,  as  before  ftated,  but  put  the  fouthern  provinces,  his 
own  corps,  and  that  of  General  Phillips  (which  he  had  called  into  co-opera- 
tion) into  imminent  danger  ;  that  by  going  into  Virginia,  he  was  about  to 
break  in  upon  the  Commander  in  Chief's  plan  of  operations  for  the  cam- 
paign, to  force  him  into  others  (he  had  always  declared  againft)  in  the  moft 
inimical  provinces,  in  the  moft  fickly  province,  at  the  moft  fickly  feafon  ;  in  a 
diftrict  where  he  could  not  long  fupply  his  army ;  from  whence  he  could  not 
retreat  except  under  moft  difgraceful  facrifices  ;  in  which  he  could  not  re- 
main in  fafety  unlefT  protected  by  a  fuperior  fleet,  or  a  refpecttable  place  of 
arms  till  fuch  fleet  mould  arrive  ;  and  this  while  there  were  laying  (and  had 
been  laying  at  Charles  Town,  from  the  yth  to  the  24th  of  April)  and  coming 
to  him,  and  he  knew  it,  and  that  there  might  be  hourly  expected  difpatches, 
orders,  and  inftructions  of  the  Commander  in  Chief,  by  the  firft  line  of 
which  he  would  have  read  the  following  words,  which  must  have  prevented  his 
going  into  Virginia  ;  March  2d,  5th,  and  8th,  "  Your  Lordfhip  may  probably 
"  have  heard,  that  the  navy  and  army  in  Virginia  are  blocked  up  by  a 
"  fuperior  French  fleet  to  that  under  Commodore  Symonds  ;  and  he  would 
have  feen  alfo,  that  General  Phillips  had  not  been  detached  into  Virginia, 
as  his  Lordfhip  said  he  had  underftood  from  Colonel  Balfour  to  have  been 
i  the 


(      19     ) 

the  fubftance  of  the  Commander  in  Chief's  difpatches,  but  that  he  waited  the 
event  of  a  naval  action  hourly  expected,  before  he  could  venture  to  fail  for 
Virginia. 

Page  393,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  as  Lord  Cornwallis  had  done  before, 
"  that  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  barely  recommended  his  plan  of  operation  to  the 
"  Southward  or  Delaware  River ;"  and  continues  thus,  "  neither  did  his 
"  Lordfhip  mean  to  engage  in  the  expedition  to  the  upper  part  of  the 
"  Chefapeak  Bay,  of  which  he  difapproved,  without  exprefT  orders  from  the 
"  Commander  in  Chief,  which  would  exempt  him  from  all  refponfibility,  at 
"  leaft,  for  the  plan  of  that  expedition." 

With  refpect  to  the  plan,  it  has  been  fo  often  and  fo  fully  detailed  in  Sir 
H.  Clinton's  narrative,  and  in  his  obfervations  to  Lord  Cornwallis's  reply 
to  it,  that  Sir  Henry  thinks  it  needier!"  to  fay  any  more  than  that  it  had  been 
formed  upon  very  general  information,  been  approved  by  his  Majefty's  Cabinet 
early  in  1781,  and  again  re-approved  in  July,  1781,  alas!  too  late,  for  Sir 
H.  Clinton  was  then  deeply  and  dangeroufly  engaged  in  operation  forced  by 
Lord  Cornwallis,  and  which,  as  he  before  ftated,  Sir  Henry  had  received 
the  King's  commands  to  adopt  and  fupport.  With  refped:  to  Sir  H.  Clinton's 
having  barely  recommended  bis  plan,  it  will  have  been  feen,  that  General 
Phillips  (to  whom  Lord  Cornwallis  had  fucceeded)  had  been  ordered  to  carry 
it  into  execution,  and  was  actually  on  his  march  to  do  fo  when  Lord  Corn- 
wallis called  him  back.  In  ftrictnefl"  it  will  be  acknowledged,  that  Lord 
Cornwallis  thus  circumftanced,  was  required,  when  he  arrived  in  Virginia, 
to  obey  fuch  orders  as  he  found  General  Phillips  acting  under  :  but  on  Mr. 
Stedman's  own  conftruction,  "  that  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  barely  recommended  it," 
was  not  Sir  H.  Clinton  refponfible  for  a  plan  which,  out  of  delicacy  to  Lord 
Cornwallis's  high  rank,  and  after  the  above  inftructions  he  had  received  from 
his  Majefty,  he  only  barely  recommended? 


Page 


(        20       ) 

Page  396,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  implies,  as  Lord  Cornwallis  had  done 
before  in  an  official  letter,  "  that  his  Lordship  had  occupied  the  naval  ftation 
"  in  York  River,  according  to  the  fpirit  of  Sir  H.  Clinton's  order  of  the 
"nth  July,  1781."  The  fhort  fact  is,  there  were  two  letters  of  that  date, 
the  firft  requiring  his  Lordfhip  to  occupy  the  Peninfula  of  Williamfberg 
(which  Sir  H.  Clinton  thought  he  had  quitted  a  little  too  hafty,  and  owing 
to  a  mifconception  of  orders)  his  Lordship  was  by  that  letter  defired  to  wait 
there  for  further  directions  as  to  the  poft  he  mould  occupy,  to  be  fent  after 
Sir  Henry  had  confulted  the  Admiral.  The  fecond  letter  was  written  after 
that  confultation  had  taken  place  ;  and  his  Lordmip  was  directed  in  it  "  to 
"  examine  and  fortify  Old  Point  Comfort  in  James  River,  to  cover  the  naval 
"  ftation  of  Hampton  Road  in  that  river  ;"  and  as  an  additional  fecurity  to 
Old  Point  Comfort,  his  Lordship  had  Sir  H.  Clinton's  confent  to  his  fortify- 
ing York  Heights  alfo,  /hould  he  think  thatnecejfary.  How  this  can  be  con- 
ftrued,  either  by  Lord  Cornwallis  or  Mr.  Stedman,  into  an  implied  order 
to  remove  the  naval  ftation  from  James  River  to  York  River,  will  be  difficult 
to  comprehend.  Sir  H.  Clinton,  fo  far  from  confidering  it  as  according  to  the 
fpirit  of  his  order  of  the  nth  of  July,  thinks  it  was  in  direct  difregard  of  it. 
Lord  Cornwallis,  if  he  difapproved  of  the  ftation  he  had  been  directed  to 
take  in  James  River,  should  (Sir  H.  Clinton  conceives)  have  reported  his 
objections  to  Old  Point  Comfort,  in  James  River,  and  recommended  York 
River,  and  waited  the  Commander  in  Chief's  approbation.  Sir  H.  Clinton 
is  free  to  acknowledge,  however,  he  did  not,  nor  should  he  not  have  difap- 
proved of  the  choice  his  Lordship  had  made  in  preference  in  York  River,  as 
his  Lordship,  when  he  made  it,  aflured  Sir  H.  Clinton,  "  that  it  was  the 
"  only  naval  ftation  in  which  he  could  hope  to  give  effectual  protection 
"  to  ships  of  the  line,"  which  was  what  the  Admiral  particularly  wished  for. 
But  had  Sir  H.  Clinton  known  then,  what  all  the  world  knew  afterwards, 
namely,  that  all  the  mips  his  Lordmip  did  not  fink,  had  been  burned  by  the 

enemy's 


enemy's  fhot  and  fhells  during  the  fiege,  he  fhould  not  so  readily  have  approved 
of  his  Lordfhip's  difobedience. 

Page  407,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  "  Lord  Cornwallis  received  affur- 
"  ances  from  Sir  H.  Clinton,  bearing  date  the  6th  September,  that  Sir  Henry 
"would  join  him  with  4000  men,  who  were  then  embarked,  as  foon  as  the 
"  Admiral  mould  be  of  opinion  that  he  might  venture  ;  and  that  Admiral 
"  Digby  was  on  the  coaft  with  troops  on  board,  and  might  be  daily  ex- 
"  pected." 

The  firft  part  is  certainly  the  fubftance  of  Sir  H.  Clinton's  letter  of  6th 
September,  but  the  laft  not  fo  by  any  means  ;  for  Sir  H.  Clinton  told  Lord 
Cornwallis,  "  he  had  heard  from  Europe  that  Admiral  Digby  might 
"  foon  be  expected  on  the  coaft,"  but  not  a  word  of  troops  being  on 
board. 

Mr.  Stedman  fays  alfo,  that,  confiftent  with  these  orders  and  inftructions, 
"  and  the  information  he  had  received,  his  Lordfhip  could  not  venture  to 
"attack  La  Fayette  before  his  junction  with  Wafhington." 

When  Sir  H.  Clinton  wrote  the  letter  of  6th  September,  he  did  not  know 
what  Lord  Cornwallis  did  know  when  he  received  it ;  namely,  that  the  whole 
French  fleet,  confifting  of  37  of  the  line,  and  that  24  of  them  had  had  an  action 
with  the  Britifh  fleet  of  19,  that  the  French  fleet  had  returned,  claiming 
victory,  into  Chesapeak  Bay,  and  there  joined  four  mips  of  the  line,  which 
they  had  left  there,  and  Barra's  fquadron  of  feven,  from  Rhode  Island.  Sir 
H.  Clinton  is  therefore  at  a  lofs  to  conceive,  how  either  Lord  Cornwallis,  or 
Mr.  Stedman  could  fuppofe,  that  his  Lordfhip  could  consider  himfelf  as 
reftricted  from  venturing  an  attempt  to  beat  an  army  in  detail  which  he  knew  was 
coming  to  befiege  him ;  an  operation  of  fuch  probable  fhort  duration,  and  fuch 
great  appearance  of  fuccefs.  Mr.  Stedman  is  not  correct  either  in  faying, 
as  Lord  Cornwallis  had  done  before,  that  the  fleet  and  troops  from  New 
York  would  fail,  to  attempt  to  fuccour  his  Lordfhip,  about  the  5th  October. 

G  Mr. 


(      M      ) 

Mr.  Stedman  fays,  that  "  On  receipt  of  Sir  H.  Clinton's  difpatches  on  the 
"  29th,  dated  the  24th,  Lord  Cornwallis  withdrew  his  army  within  the 
"  works  of  York  Town."  Mr.  Stedman  fpeaks  of  Lord  Cornwallis's  quitting 
the  exterior  pofition,  and  retiring  to  the  interior  as  a  matter  of  courfe.  If  Mr. 
Stedman  had  attended  to  Lord  Cornwallis's  letter,  of  the  22d  Auguft,  he 
would  have  feen  (fpeaking  of  that  exterior  pofition)  "  that  his  Lordfhip's  en- 
"  gineer  had  been  many  days  making  an  exact  furvey  of  it ;  that  he  had  pro- 
pofed  his  plan  for  fortifying  it,  which  his  Lordfhip  approving,  had  ordered  to 
"  be  executed  ;  that  it  would  probablv  be  completed  in  about  fix  weeks,  with- 
"  out  any  great  labour  to  the  troops,  and  that  his  Lordfhip  could  spare  1000 
"  men  from  every  thing  but  labour:"  nor  does  that  Gentleman  probably 
know  the  opinions  certain  officers  of  rank,  who  had  feen  the  ground,  gave  of 
it  before  a  Council  of  War  of  Admirals  and  Generals — their  opinion  was, 
"  That  his  Lordfhip  might  defend  that  pofition  twenty-one  days,  open 
"  trenches,  againft  20,000  men  and  a  proportionable  artillery."  After  all 
this,  it  no  doubt  appeared  to  Sir  H.  Clinton  fomewhat  extraordinary,  that  his 
Lordfhip  fhould  quit  fuch  works  in  fuch  a  pofition,  without  a  conflict,  leav- 
ing to  the  enemy,  in  General  Wafhington's  own  words,  in  his  letter  to 
Congrefs  of  October  i.  "The  enemy,  to  our  aftonifhment,  have  quitted 
"  their  exterior  pofition,  and  we  are  now  in  pofsefsion  of  ground  which  com- 
"  mands,  in  a  near  advance,  all  the  reft  of  their  works,"  which  works  Lord 
Cornwallis  difcribes  himfelf,  "as  unfinished,  enfiladed,  and  commanded;" 
nor  is  it  lefs  wonderful,  that  Lord  Cornwallis  fhould,  after  he  had  repeatedly 
and  preffingly  invited  Sir  H.  Clinton  to  join  him  in  York  River,  give  up  the 
only  door  by  which  Sir  Henry  could  enter. 

Page  410,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  very  juftly  obferves,  that  "Lord  Corn- 
"  wallis  could  not  venture  to  make  large  and  frequent  forties,  from  the  man- 
"  ner  and  caution  with  which  the  enemy  made  their  approaches,  and  in  the 
"  unfinifhed  ftate  of  his  own  works." 

Page 


Page  394,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  that  "  Lord  Cornwallis  had,  when 
"  his  Lordfhip  was  reduced  to  extremity,  formed  a  defign  of  forcing  his  way 
"  through  Maryland,  &c.  to  New  York."  Sir  H.  Clinton  confeffes  he  never 
faw  the  leaft  day-light  in  this  project ;  but,  furely,  if  his  Lordfhip  had  ever 
had  fuch  an  intention,  he  mould  have  made  it  known  to  Sir  H.  Clinton,  that 
he  might  have  co-operated;  and  not,  as  he  did  repeatedly,  tell  Sir  H.  Clin- 
ton, "that  no  diverfion  would  be  of  the  leaft  ufe  to  him  ;  that  the  only  way 
"  to  fuccour  him  was  to  join  him  in  York  River." 

Page  394,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  that  "Lord  Cornwallis  had  expreffed 
"  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  a  willingnefs,  if  he  approved,  to  return  to 
"  Charles  Town  and  refume  the  command  there."  It  is  very  true,  that  his 
Lordfhip  did  offer  to  return  to  South  Carolina.  If  bis  Lord/hip  had  never  left 
it,  His  Majejty  might  have  remained  Sovereign  of  that  great  Continent ;  but,  furely, 
after  the  opinion  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  repeatedly  given  his  Lordfhip  and  the 
Minifter,  of  the  fatal  confequences  which  had  already  happened,  and  pre- 
dicted fti'l  others,  it  was  little  likely  for  Sir.  H.  Clinton  to  confent  to  take  the 
whole  refponfibility  of  fuch  operations  on  himfelf.  Sir  Henry  therefore  di- 
rected Lord  Cornwallis  to  occupy  a  naval  ftation  in  James  River,  and  left  his 
Lordfhip's  force  entire  to  fecure  that  important  ftation. 

Page  397,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  fays,  "  If  any  doubt  exifted  before  as  to 
"  the  point  of  attack,  it  was  now  removed.  Nothing  could  any  where  be 
"  done  without  a  fleet  covering ;  and  as  the  Comte  de  Graffe  had  determined 
"  to  enter  the  Chefapeak,  it  was  agreed  between  Wafhington  and  Rocham- 
"  beau,  that  Virginia  mould  be  the  fcene,  and  an  attack  upon  Lord  Corn- 
"  wallis  the  object  of  their  operations.  Letters  to  this  effect  were  difpatched 
"  to  meet  Comte  de  Graffe  on  his  paffage  ;  and,  in  the  mean  time,  meafures 
"  were  taken  to  continue  Sir  H.  Clinton  in  the  belief,  that  New  York,  and 
"  not  York  Town  in  Virginia,  was  ftill  the  object  of  their  enterprize.  After 
"  feveral  movements,  and  various  deceptions  to  induce  this  belief,  the  allied 
2  "  army 


"  army  fuddenly  marched   acrofs  Jerfey  to   Philadelphia,  where  it  arrived  on 
"  the  joth  of  Auguft." 

Mr.  Stedman  infinuates,  (as  others  had  done,  but  had  long  ceafed  to  do) 
that  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  been  deceived  into  an  idea  that  New  York,  and  not 
York  Town  in  Virginia,  had  been  the  object  of  the  Allies.  It  is  now  well 
known,  (and  Sir  H.  Clinton  did  not  conceive  any  perfon  could  be  ignorant  of 
it)  that  New  York,  and  not  York  Town,  was  the  object,  even  fo  late  as  when 
De  Graffe  arrived  off  Chefapeak  from  the  Weft  Indies  ;  but,  on  his  pilot's 
refufing  to  carry  his  large  mips  over  the  bar  of  New  York,  finding  alfo  that 
the  Britifh  fleet  had  not  followed  that  of  France  in  any  proportion,  feeing  the 
expofed  fituation  of  Lord  Cornwallis  at  York  Town,  it  was  determined  to 
make  his  Lordfhip  the  object  of  their  joint  operations.  If  Sir  H.  Clinton  was 
deceived,  it  was  by  Lord  Cornwallis's  coming  into  Virginia,  difregarding  Sir 
H.  Clinton's  orders,  forming  operations  there,  and  recommending  it  to  the 
Minifter — by  the  Admirals  in  the  West  Indies  not  bringing  or  fending  a  suffi- 
cient naval  force  to  protect  fuch  operations,  as  they  had  been  repeatedly  ordered 
to  do,  and  by  the  Cabinet  of  that  day  not  enforcing  His  Majefty's  orders  to 
his  admirals. 

Page  415,  vol.  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  writes,  "  Unfortunately,  the  letter  written 
"  by  Lord  Cornwallis  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  acquainting  him  with  the 
"  furrender  of  the  Ports  of  York  and  Gloucefter,  and  narrating  the  caufes 
"  which  led  to  that  event,  with  the  motives  that  influenced  his  own  conduct, 
"  produced  a  difference  between  them,  which  terminated  in  an  appeal  to  the 
"  Public." 

Sir  H.  Clinton  has,  and  does  moft  willingly,  leave  it  to  the  public  to  decide  ; 
and  he  trufts  that  the  public  have  long  since  decided,  that  "  in  narrating  the 
"  caufes  which  led  to  the  cataftrophe  of  York  Town,"  which  clofed  the  un- 
fortunate campaign  of  1781,  and  loft  that  great  Continent,  his  Lordfhip  has 
produced  as  caufes,  what  he  is  not  authorifed  to  affert  as  facts,  fupported  by 

any 


any  documents  he  has  or  can  produce.  Without  repeating  the  whole  of  that 
letter,  Sir  H.  Clinton  will  extract  only  one  or  two  paragraphs: 

Firft,  his  Lordfhip  fays,  "  I  never  faw  this  poft  in  any  favorable  light ; 
"  but  when  I  found  I  was  to  be  attacked  in  it,  in  fo  unprepared  a  ftate,  by  fo 
"powerful  an  army  and  artillery,  nothing  but  the  hopes*  of  relief  would  have 
"  induced  me  to  attempt  its  defence ;  for  I  would  either  have  endeavoured  to 
"  efcape  to  New  York  by  rapid  marches  from  Gloucefter  fide,  immediately  on 
"  the  arrival  of  General  Washington  at  Williamuburgh,  or  I  would,  notwith- 
"  ftanding  the  difparity  of  numbers,  have  attacked  them  in  the  open  field, 
"  where  it  might  have  been  juft  poflible  that  fortune  would  have  favoured  the 
"  gallantry  of  the  handful  of  troops  under  my  command ;  but  being  aflured 
"  by  your  Excellency's  letters,  that  every  poflible  means  would  be  tried  by 
"  navy  and  army  to  relieve  us,  I  could  not  think  myfelf  at  liberty  to  venture 
"  upon  either  defperate  attempts  ;  therefore,  after  remaining  two  days  in  a 
"  ftrongf  pofition  in  the  front  of  this  place,  in  the  hopes  of  being  attacked,  upon 
"  obferving  that  the  enemy  were  taking  meafures  to  turn  my  left  flank  in  a 
"  fhort  time,  and  receiving  on  the  fecond  evening  your  letter  of  the  24th 
"  September,  informing  me  that  relief  would  fail  about  the  5th  October,  I 
"withdrew  within  the  works  on  the  night  of  the  29th  September." 

Sir  H.  Clinton  muft  again  appeal  to  the  candour  of  the  public  to  determine, 
whether,  by  the  above  extract,  his  Lordfhip  does  not  in  the  ftrongeft  terms 
imply,  nay  aflert,  that  he  had  been  prevented  attacking  the  enemy  in  the  field, 
or  efcaping  immediately  on  the  junction  of  General  Wafhington  and  La 
Fayette,  by  Sir  H.  Clinton  s  ajfurances  that  the  navy  and  army  would  do  every 
thing  to  fuccour  him,  and  that  relief  would  fail  about  the  5th  October  ?  Sir 

*  Lord  Cornwallis  could  have  no  hopes  till  29th  September. 

t  His  Lordship's  own  description  of  this  exterior  posi  ion — "  a  Gorge  between  two  Creeks 
"or  Ravines,  which  come  from  the  river  on  each  side  the  town."  What  Washington  says  of 
this  exterior  position  proves  its  situation  in  other  respects.  How  such  a  position  could  be 
turned,  or  how  it  could  be  quitted  without  a  shot,  is  for  Lord  Cornwallis  to  explain. 

H  H.  Clin- 


(        26       ) 

H.  Clinton  is  once  more  under  the  neceffity  of  afferting,  that  Lord  Cornwallis 
did  not  receive  any  aflurances  of  the  exertions  of  the  navy,  or  of  the  navy's 
making  any  attempt  to  fuccour  him,  till  the  2^th  September  (all  which  his 
.Lordfhip  has  fince  acknowledged)  and  he  confequently  was  not  prevented 
from  making  either  of  the  above  attempts,  by  any  aflurances  of  fuccour  he 
had  received  from  Sir  H.  Clinton,  as  the  junction  with  Wafhington  and  La 
Fayette  was  made  two  or  three  days  before  Lord  Cornwallis  received  fuch  af- 
furances.  Nor  did  Sir  H.  Clinton,  in  his  letter  of  the  24th  of  September, 
which  his  Lordfhip  received  on  the  29th,  fay,  (as  his  Lordfhip  afferts  he  did) 
that  relief  would  Jail  about  the  $th  of  October.  Sir  H.  Clinton's  words  were, 
"there  is  every  reafon  to  hope  the  feet  will  fail."  Sir  H.  Clinton  is  under 
the  necefsity  of  mentioning  this  alfo,  becaufe  the  Admirals,  on  reading  the 
above  aflertion  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  blamed  Sir  H.  Clinton  for  having  given 
his  Lordfhip  too  much  hopes. 

Lord  Cornwallis  fays  also,  "Our  ftock  of  intrenching  tools,  which  did  not 
"  much  exceed  400  when  we  began  to  work  in  the  latter  end  of  Auguft, 
"  was  now  much  diminifhed." 

Sir.  H.  Clinton  can  only  repeat,  that  a  very  great  proportion  indeed  was  fent 
to  Chefapeak.  He  is  informed  that  many  were  returned  to  New  York  by  his 
Lordfhip's  order  ;  but  he  muft  declare,  that  when  he  called  upon  the  Chief 
Engineer  for  his  return  of  intrenching  tools  upon  the  Tor k  fide  when  the  works  were 
begun  upon,  by  that  return  it  appears  his  Lordfhip  had  992. 

Now  as  his  Lordfhip  and  Mr.  Stedman  both  fay,  that  his  Lordfhip's  letter 
of  the  2oth  October  was  written  to  narrate  the  caufes  which  led  to  the  cataf- 
trophe  of  York  Town,  Sir  H.  Clinton  finds  himfelf  authorifed  to  aflert,  that 
his  Lordship  has  produced  as  caufes,  and  aflerted  as  facts,  what  he  cannot 
fupport  as  fuch. 

One  circumftance  more  Sir  H.  Clinton  thinks  neceffary  to  mention,  as  it 
never  has  been  well  underftood.  About  the  month  of  March,  1782,  certain 

Com- 


Commiflioners  appointed  by  both  parties  met :  whatever  was  the  oftenfible 
objecl  of  their  meeting,  it  poffibly  anfwered  fome  political  purpofes  to  both 
Chiefs.  Certain  Loyalifts,  from  what  motives  I  mail  not  attempt  to  account, 
were  guilty  of  an  aft  of  atrocity,  which,  under  all  the  circumftances  attending, 
it,  is,  I  think,  fcarcely  to  be  paralleled  in  hiftory,  and  which  tended  to  deftroy 
the  little  confidence  there  remained  between  the  parties  at  war,  to  prevent 
all  future  intercourfe,  and,  in  fliort,  feems  to  throw  away  the  fcabbard.  Sir 
H.  Clinton  wifhing  to  unite  every  exertion  of  the  Continent,  had  formed  a 
Board,  compofed  of  all  the  principal  Refugees,  given  them  powers  to  afTemble 
troops  and  fleets,  gave  them  veflels,  victualled  and  armed  them,  and  fupplied 
them  occasionally  with  money  ;  but  fearing  their  resentment  againft  the  Rebels, 
(for  which  there  was,  no  doubt,  but  too  much  caufe)  Sir  H.  Clinton  endea- 
voured to  guard  againft  its  dangerous  effedts,  by  limiting  their  powers  in  fome 
refpects.  The  above  Board  fent  a  meflage  to  Sir  H.  Clinton,  defiring  leave  to 
take  from  the  King's  prifoners,  a  perfon  of  the  name  of  Huddy,  who  had  been 
taken  by  them  ;  they  informed  Sir  Henry,  it  was  their  wifh  to  fend  that  pri- 
foner  to  the  rebel  more,  there  to  offer  him  in  exchange  for  one  of  their 
friends.  Sir  H.  Clinton  confented.  They  then  delivered  Huddy  over  to  a 
perfon  of  the  name  of  Lippicut,  who  was  a  Captain  of  theirs,  and  to  whom, 
by  their  defire,  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  given  a  militia  commiffion.  This  perfon, 
and  others  with  him,  carried  the  prifoner  Huddy  to  the  rebel  more,  landed 
him  in  Jerfey,  and  inftead  of  offering  him  in  exchange,  as  they  had  informed 
Sir  Henry  they  intended  to  do,  they  hanged  him,  and  left  him  hanging  on  a 
tree.  This  happened  while  the  above-named  Congrefs  were  fitting  not  many 
miles  diftant.  The  inftant  Sir  H.  Clinton  was  informed  of  the  outrage,  he 
fent  to  the  Board  to  dired:  them  to  inquire  and  report  :  their  anfwer  was,  that 
Captain  Lippicut  was  gone  to  the  races,  and  on  his  return  he  probably  would 
report  to  them.  Offended  that  this  meflage  had  been  attended  with  fo  much 
levity,  Sir  H.  Clinton  ordered  Captain  Lippicut  to  be  feized  and  brought  pri- 
i  foner. 


foner.  He  then  aflembled  all  the  fuperior  officers  of  the  navy  and  army,  pro- 
vincial and  foreign,  and,  at  their  unanimous  requeft,  ordered  Lippicut  to  be 
tried  by  a  General  Court  Martial  for  murder.  A  Court  Martial  was  aflem- 
bled, compofed  as  above.  After  it  had  fat  three  days,  Sir  H.  Clinton  re- 
ceived a  very  improper  letter  from  General  Wafliington,  threatening  to  punim 
the  innocent,  unlefs  the  guilty  were  delivered  up  to  him.  Sir  H.  Clinton,  in 
anfwer,  rebuked  Mr.  Wamington  for  prefuming  to  interfere  in  his  command, 
reminded  him  of  the  many  atrocious  provocations  which  had  been  given  ;  in- 
forming him,  however,  what  fteps  he  had  thought  proper  to  take,  and  that  he 
mould  be  made  acquainted  with  the  refult.  The  trial  continued  ;  General 
Robinfon,  who  had  at  firft  been  named  to  fucceed  Sir  H.  Clinton,  begged  his 
permiffion  to  write  to  General  Wamington,  not  doubting  but  he  mould  be 
able,  as  he  faid,  to  foften  him.  Sir  H.  Clinton,  after  predicting  the  fate  of 
fuch  an  application,  confented.  Sir  Guy  Carleton,  who  was  appointed  to 
fucceed  to  Sir  H.  Clinton,  arrived  before  General  Waihington  had  anfwered 
General  Robinfon's  letter.  Three  days  before  Sir  H.  Clinton  quitted  the  com- 
mand, General  Robinfon  received  General  Wafhington's  anfwer  in  most  in- 
fulting  terms,  threatening  to  punim  the  innocent  for  the  guilty ;  and  before 
Sir  H.  Clinton  left  New  York,  Sir  Guy  Carleton,  who  had  alfo  written  to 
General  Wafhington  on  the  fame  fubject,  informed  Sir  H.  Clinton,  that 
though  his  anfwer  was  very  civil  perfonally  to  him,  he  was,  neverthelefs,  de- 
termined refpecling  the  fubjecl  he  had  written  upon.  Sir  H.  Clinton  failed 
for  Europe ;  and  he  has  been  informed  fince,  that  foon  after  the  Court  Mar- 
tial had  adjourned  from  day  to  day,  and  finally  fine  die;  and  that  General 
Waihington  on  this  ordered  the  army  of  the  York  Town  Convention  to  draw 
lots,  which  fell  upon  Captain  Afgill  of  the  Guards  ;  that  the  Court  Martial 
did  re-aflemble.  It  is  prefumed,  that  foon  after  this  General  Wamington  may 
have  difcovered  that  he  had  acted  rather  rajhly,  in  feizing  upon  a  prifoner  under 
formal  Convention,  and  in  which  the  French  nation  was  included  as  a -party ;  he  there- 
fore 


fore  did  all  he  could  to  induce  Captain  Afgill  to  efcape.  Captain  Afgill, 
without  the  leaft  fufpicion  of  their  motive,  very  honourably  difdained  to  make 
ufe  of  the  opportunities  which  prefented  themfelves.  Information,  it  is  faid, 
was  repeatedly  fent  to  Sir  Guy  Carleton,  who  probably  faw  it  exactly  as 
above  ftated,  and  judged  that  General  Wafhington  did  not  dare,  for  the 
above  reafons,  execute  his  threats.  The  Court  Martial  continued  fitting,  and 
proceeded  to  the  following  fentence :  "  That  although  Jofhua  Huddy  was 
"  executed  without  proper  authority,  what  the  prifoner  did  in  the  matter  was 
"  not  the  effect  of  malice  or  ill-will,  but  proceeded  from  a  conviction,  that 
"  it  was  his  duty  to  obey  the  orders  of  the  Board  of  Directors  of  Aflbciated 
"  Loyalifts ;  and  his  not  doubting  their  having  full  authority  to  give  fuch 
"  orders,  they  acquit  him." 

General  Wamington  and  Congrefs  feeing  that  Captain  Afgill  would  not 
efcape,  it  is  prefumed,  contrived  to  have  it  hinted  to  Captain  Afgill's  friends 
here,  that  they  would  do  well  to  apply  through  the  Court  of  France ;  they  did 
fo  ;  and,  it  is  faid,  the  Oueen  of  France  aflced  as  a  favour  of  Congrefs  and 
General  Wafliington,  what  was  certainly  doing  both  a  great  favour,  inafmuch 
as  it  re'ieved  them  from  an  aukward  fituation  in  which  they  had  precipitately 
and  inconfiderately  plunged  themfelves.  There  is  no  doubt,  if  Captain  Afgill 
had  efcaped,  that  Captain  Schanks  of  the  fyth  regiment,  a  prifoner  of  war,  or 
fome  other  prifoner  of  war,  would  have  been  executed. 

Page  429,  vol  ii.  Mr.  Stedman  feems  to  imply,  that  "  Sir  H.  Clinton  had 
"  been  fuperfeded  in  the  command  by  Sir  Guy  Carleton." 

Sir  H.  Clinton  mall  clofe  thefe  Obfervations  with  a  few  letters  received  from 
His  Majefty's  Minifters  at  different  periods  of  his  command  in  America,  as 
proofs,  that  from  the  moment  he  firft  received  His  Majefty's  orders  to  take  that 
command,  to  the  hour  His  Majefty  was  gracioufly  pleafed  to  permit  him  to 
refign  to  Sir  Guy  Carleton,  he  had  the  fatisfaction  to  receive  His  Majefty's  ap- 
probation of  his  conduct. 

I  Sir 


(     30     ) 

Sir  H.  Clinton  was,  by  His  Majefty's  orders,  to  take  the  command  of  his 
armies  in  North  America  in  1778,  on  Sir  William  Howe  having  obtained 
His  Majefty's  permiflion  to  refign,  but  after  14,000  men,  inftead  of  being 
added  to  the  army,  (which  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  every  reafon  to  expect)  had 
been  taken  from  it — finding  on  the  contrary,  that  the  enemy  oppofed  to  him 
had  increafed  in  numbers;  that  many  French  officers  had  entered  into  it;  that 
it  had  been  reinforced  by  a  French  army,  and  its  operations  occafionally  fup- 
ported  by  a  French  fleet  much  fuperior  to  the  Britifh — that,  although  reduced 
in  a  great  meafure  to  a  war  expedition,  the  Admiral,  appointed  as  his  col- 
league, thought  and  acted,  in  almoft  every  inftance,  different  from  Sir  H. 
Clinton — finding,  under  all  thefe  circumftances,  he  could  no  longer  have 
hopes  of  acting  with  advantage  to  his  country,  and  honor  and  credit  to  him- 
felf,  Sir  Henry  moft  humbly  requefted  His  Majefty's  permiflion  to  refign  the 
command  of  the  army  to  Lord  Cornwallis,  as  the  next  officer  in  rank  to  him. 
The  following  is  the  anfwer  Sir  H.  Clinton  received  to  his  folicitation,  dated 
November  4,  1799. 

Extract  of  Lord  GEORGE  GERMAINE'S  letter  to  Sir  H.  CLINTON,  November  4, 

1779. 

"  I  did  not  omit  the  earlieft  opportunity  of  laying  before  his  Majefty  your 
"  letter  of  2oth  Auguft,  in  which  you  exprefl"  your  defire  of  being  permitted 
"  to  return  to  England,  and  refign  the  command  of  the  troops  to  Lord  Corn- 
"  wallis.  Though  the  King  has  great  confidence  in  Lord  Cornwallis's  abili- 
"  ties,  yet  his  Majefty  is  too  well  fatisfied  with  your  conduct  to  wifh  to  fee 
"  the  command  of  his  army  in  other  hands.  You  have  had  too  recent  proofs 
"  of  his  Majefty's  favour  to  doubt  of  his  Royal  Approbation.  Though  your 
"  army  is  much  diminifhed,  yet  you  have  fhewn,  that  activity  and  good  con- 
"  duct  can  enfure  fuccefs  ;  and,  I  muft  add,  that  Generals  gain  at  leaft  as 
2.  "  much 


"  much  honour  by  their  able  management  of  fmall  armies,  as  where  they  aft 
"  with  a  fuperiority  which  commands  fuccefs." 

This  letter  Sir  H.  Clinton  received  while  engaged  in  the  fiege  of  Charles 
Town  in  April,  1780;  at  the  fuccefsful  conclufion  of  which,  Sir  Henry  re- 
ceived moft  ample  teftimony  of  his  Sovereign's  approbation  :  but  having  ftill 
ftronger  reafon  to  induce  him  to  wim  to  refign  the  command,  he  perfifted 
in  his  humble  requeft,  particularly  when  he  found  bis  plan  of  operations  for 
the  campaign  of  1781,  which  he  had  flattered  himfelf  had  been  approved,  was 
now  fufpended,  and  a  preference  given  to  one  offered  by  a  fubordinate  Gene- 
ral, made  without  the  means  of  general  information,  which  Sir  H.  Clinton 
was  ordered  to  adopt  and  fupport.  Sir.  H.  Clinton,  who,  from  the  particular 
fituation  of  the  army  at  the  time,  could  not  refign,  had  he  even  obtained  his 
Majefty's  permiflion,  after  making  his  ftrongeft  remonftrances,  and  pointing 
out  the  danger  of  the  plan  he  was  ordered  to  adopt,  obeyed,  re-inforced,  fup- 
ported,  affifted  operation  to  his  utmoft ;  and  when  (as  he  had  predicted  it 
would)  the  army  under  Lord  Cornwallis  was  dangeroufly  engaged,  Sir  H. 
Clinton  embarked  on  board  an  inferior  fleet  of  twenty-five  fail  of  the  line  to 
force  his  way  through  thirty-feven  of  the  enemy,  and  attempt  a  junction  with 
Lord  Cornwallis,  determining,  however,  if  he  had  fucceeded,  to  refign  the 
command  to  his  Lordmip.  At  the  inftant  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  embarked,  and 
was  proceeding  to  attempt  a  junction  with  Lord  Cornwallis,  he  received  the 
following  letter  from  Lord  George  Germaine,  dated  July  7,  1781  : 

"  The  uneafinefs  you  exprefs  about  Admiral  Arbuthnot's  continuing  in  the 
"  command  of  the  fleet,  muft  have  ceafed  long  before  this  reaches  you,  as 
"  Admiral  Digby  is  appointed  to  command  his  Majefty's  fhips  in  North 
"  America,  in  the  room  of  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  fo  that  I  conclude  he  will 
"  have  left  the  command  fome  time  before  Mr.  Digby  arrives,  and,  I  truft,  in 
"  full  time  to  prevent  your  refigning  the  command  to  Earl  Cornwallis." 

Extraft 


(     32     ) 
Extrafl  of  a  Letter  from  Lord  G.  GERMAINE,  July   14,    1781. 

"  I  loft  no  time  in  laying  before  His  Majefty  your  letter,  No.  130,  and 
"  that  of  the  9th  June ;  and  it  is  with  unfeigned  pleafure  I  obey  his  Majefty's 
"  commands  in  expreffing  to  you  his  Royal  Approbation  of  the  plan  you  have 
"  adopted  for  profecuting  the  war  on  the  fouth  of  Delawar,  and  of  the  fuc- 
"  cours  you  have  furnimed  and  inftructions  you  have  given  for  carrying  it 
"  into  execution.  I  cannot  clofe  this  letter  without  repeating  to  you  the  very 
"  great  fatisfaction  your  difpatch  has  given  me,  and  my  mod  entire  coincidence 
"  with  you  in  the  plan  you  have  propofed  to  Lord  Cornwallis  for  diftrefling 
"  the  Rebels,  and  recovering  the  Southern  Provinces  to  the  King's  obedience; 
"  and  as  his  Lordfhip,  when  he  receives  your  letters  of  the  8th  and  i  ith  of 
"  June,  will  have  fully  feen  the  reafonablenefs  of  it,  I  have  not  the  leaft 
"  doubt  but  his  Lordfhip  has  executed  it." 

It  will  have  been  feen   that   Lord   Cornwallis  had   not  thought  or  acted  as 

O 

the  Minifter  expected.  If  the  cataftrophe  of  York  Town  was  completed  be- 
fore Sir  H.  Clinton  arrived  off  Chefapeak  Bay,  if  there  were  any  delays  in  the 
equipment  or  failing  of  the  fleet,  if  Lord  Cornwallis  did  not  defend  this  ex- 
terior pofition,  or  the  interior,  fo  long  as  Sir  H.  Clinton  had  reafon  from  his 
Lordfhip's  accounts  to  expect  he  would,  none  of  them  can  be  imputed  furely 
to  Sir  H.  Clinton  or  the  army.  The  troops  were  actually  embarked  a  fort- 
night before  the  fleet  was  ready  to  fail.  On  reading  Lord  Cornwallis's  letter 
of  the  2oth  October,  after  his  capitulation,  the  expreflions  before  alluded  to 
had  ftruck  Sir  H.  Clinton  ;  but  out  of  delicacy  he  had  fent  that  letter  to  Eng- 
land without  any  comment,  waiting  till  he  mould  have  feen  Lord  Cornwallis. 
In  a  converfation  he  had  with  Lord  Cornwallis,  on  his  arrival  at  New  York, 
Sir  H.  Clinton  mentioned  all  the  objectionable  parts  of  that  letter,  and  among 

other 


(     33     ) 

other  things  that  his  Lordfhip  had  afferted,  Sir  Henry  had  given  affurances  of 
the  exertions  of  the  navy  to  attempt  to  fuccour  his  Lordfhip  before  the  24th 
September,  which  his  Lordfhip  had  received  the  29th  ;  Lord  Cornwallis  ac- 
knowledged "  if  he  had  faid  fo,  he  had  faid  what  was  wrong."  Sir  Henry 
mentioned  fome  other  particulars,  and  Lord  Cornwallis  feemed  either  tacitly 
or  formally  to  acknowledge  Sir  H.  Clinton  was  right. 

Sir  H.  Clinton  finds  it  neceffary  to  mention  another  proof  of  his  Majefty's 
approbation  of  his  conduct.  Whether  the  fevere  cenfures  pafsed  upon  Lord 
Cornwallis's  loth  article  of  his  capitulation  of  York  Town,  were  merited  or 
not,  Sir  H.  Clinton  mail  not  now  enter  into  ;  the  effect  it  had  uponlhe  whole 
body  of  Loyalifts  on  the  continent  of  America,  was  alarming  indeed  ;  and  the 
impreffion  it  had  made  on  his  Majefty  and  his  Minifters,  is  fufficiently  shewn 
by  the  following  extract  of  a  letter  from  Lord  George  Germaine,  dated  De- 
cember 6,  1781  : 

"  It  gave  his  Majefty  great  concern  to  find,  by  the  copies  of  the  articles  of 
"  Lord  Cornwallis's  capitulation  and  correfpondence  with  General  Wafhing- 
"  ton  enclosed  in  your  No.  146,  that  the  alarm  taken  by  the  King's  loyal  fub- 
"jects,  who  have  borne  arms  in  fupport  of  the  Conftitution,  upon  the 
"  rumours  of  the  loth  article,  was  not  without  caufe ;  but  it  gave  great  fatis- 
"  faction  to  his  Majefty  to  find,  by  the  report  I  made  him  of  your  Aid-de- 
"  camp's  converfation  with  me,  that  you  had  intended  to  take  the  moft  likely 
"  means  of  quieting  their  apprehenfions,  and  reftoring  their  confidence,  by 
"  giving  out  in  public  orders  the  ftrongeft  affurances  that  no  poft,  place,  or 
"  garrifon,  fhould  be  furrendered  on  any  terms  which  might  difcriminate  be- 
'•  tween  them,  or  put  one  on  a  worfe  footing  than  the  other ;  and  his  Ma- 
"jefty  commanded  me  to  exprefs  to  you  his  approbation  of  thofe  orders,  and 
"  to  fignify  to  you  his  Royal  Pleafure,  that  you,  in  his  Majefty's  name,  give 
"  the  Loyal  Refugees  the  ftrongeft  affurances,"  &c.  &c. 

Thus, 


(     34     ) 

Thus,  from  the  inftant  Sir  H.  Clinton  was  ordered  to  take  the  command 
of  the  army,  to  the  moment  he  obtained  his  Majefty's  permiffion  to  refign  it,  he 
flatters  himfelf  he  produces  indifputable  proofs  of  his  Majefty's  fulleft 
approbation  of  his  conduct. 


FINIS 


\ 


YE  07CC8 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 
BERKELEY 

Return  to  desk  from  which  borrowed. 
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SEP 


LD  21-95m-ll,'50(2877sl6)476 


